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THE VITALITY OF THE AMERICAN
SOVEREIGN
Todd E. Pettys*
AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR. By Christian G. Fritz. Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press. 2008. Pp. xi, 413. Hardcover, $80;
paper, $29.99.
The proposition that "the people" are the preeminent sovereign in the
United States has long been a tenet of American public life. The authors of
the Declaration of Independence characterized the American people's sover-
eignty as a "self-evident" truth when announcing the colonies' decision to
sever their ties with Great Britain,' the delegates to the Philadelphia Conven-
tion in 1787 invoked the people's sovereignty when framing the nation's• • 2
Constitution, and Americans today exercise their sovereignty each time
they cast their ballots on Election Day. Yet what prerogatives, precisely, does
the people's sovereignty entail? In modem America, where neither a bloody
revolution nor an entirely new constitution is in the offing, can the people's
sovereignty manifest itself in ways other than through participation in the
nation's elections?
In American Sovereigns: The People and America's Constitutional Tra-
dition Before the Civil War, Christian Fritz' aims to recover for his readers a
conception of the people's sovereignty that is far broader than the concep-
tion he believes prevails today. Focusing on the period between the
Revolutionary and Civil Wars, Fritz argues that numerous events--events
that historians often mistakenly regard as unrelated-can be fully appreci-
ated only if one sees them as battles in the larger war between two
competing understandings of the people's sovereignty. The narrow under-
standing, which Fritz believes ultimately triumphed, holds that the people
may influence day-to-day governmental affairs only through elections and
other limited mechanisms that elected officials might authorize, and that
Article V of the Constitution describes the exclusive methods by which the
Constitution may be changed. The broad understanding permits the sover-
eign people to intervene directly in day-to-day governmental affairs with or
* Professor of Law and Bouma Fellow in Trial Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
I. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that ... it is the Right of the People to ... institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.").
2. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States ... do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.").
3. Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
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without elected officials' consent, and to alter their constitutional arrange-
ments by any means they deem appropriate. With few exceptions, Fritz
argues, the broad understanding of the people's sovereignty has been "lost
... as a viable principle" (p. 280) and, for all practical purposes, sovereignty
today rests in the hands of government officials (p. 298). This, Fritz argues,
is regrettable. "The belief in a powerful and direct role for the people as the
sovereign is part of America's historical experience with written constitu-
tions," he writes, "and should not be ignored" (p. 283).
In Part I, I recount Fritz's central arguments, elaborating on the two sov-
ereignty models that Fritz identifies and the ways in which he finds those
models manifested in historical events. In Part II, I dispute Fritz's claim that
Americans today have essentially ceded their sovereign prerogatives to gov-
ernment officials. Contrary to Fritz's suggestion, ordinary Americans do still
sometimes intervene directly in day-to-day governmental affairs in ways
that are unauthorized by their elected leaders, and they do alter their consti-
tutional landscape by means other than those formally authorized by Article
V. Even more fundamentally, the American people today reject the more
extreme strains of the two models that Fritz describes. Rather, Americans
have determined that their long-term interests are often best served by mani-
festing their sovereign desires through extended interactions with
government officials and institutions-interactions that permit the sovereign
people to retain ultimate control over their government and their Constitu-
tion, but that permit government institutions to retain the credibility and
power they need in order to do the people's work.
I. THE BOOK'S ACCOUNT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY DEBATE
A. Two Competing Models
Fritz contends that two fundamentally different conceptions of the peo-
ple's sovereignty competed for Americans' attachment prior to the Civil
War. The first was the narrow view that many Founding-era Federalists fa-
vored. This view holds that, having legitimized the Constitution with their
consent, the American people now can express their sovereign wishes only
through elections and other "government-sanctioned procedures" (p. 3). Af-
ter voting on Election Day, citizens must limit their involvement in
government to activities that can be performed from the sidelines-such as
lobbying elected officials and praising or criticizing their conduct-unless
the people's elected leaders invite the people onto the playing field for some
brief and limited purpose.
Under this narrow understanding of the people's sovereignty, moreover,
the Constitution remains unchanged until the country alters its constitutional
bearings using the amendment mechanisms specified in Article V of the
Constitution itself (pp. 4, 135-38, 146-47). The people cannot legitimately
amend their fundamental law by any other means. Even here, the country's
4. The exceptions primarily consist of the recent scholarly work of popular constitutional-
ists. Pp. 280-81.
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elected leaders play the leading role, because it is only those leaders-either
in Congress or in state legislatures-who have the power under Article V to
initiate the amendment process.5 Apart from the task of periodically choos-
ing the people's representatives, therefore, sovereignty functionally rests
entirely in the hands of government officials, and the citizenry at large "has
no practical role to play in the operation of government" (p. 298).
Based on his analysis of numerous historical events (ranging, as I de-
scribe below, from the battle over debt relief in Massachusetts in the 1780s
to the debate over the People's Constitution in Rhode Island in the 1840s),
Fritz contends that many early Americans had a much broader understand-
ing of the people's sovereign powers. Seen from the vantage point of this
second model, the sovereign people are entitled to direct the country's day-
to-day governmental affairs, as well as to alter or abolish-by any means
they find appropriate-the constitutional arrangements under which those
affairs are conducted (pp. 3-4). "Drafting constitutions during the Revolu-
tion ... led many to expect that as the sovereign they would have an
ongoing right and obligation to act," Fritz writes (p. 22). "Creating written
constitutions expressed but did not exhaust the people's role as the sover-
eign" (p. 22). On this view, "voting during periodic elections expressed the
people's will in an initial way that did not foreclose other, more direct ex-
pressions of the people's sovereignty" (p. 98). Moreover, although Article V
describes ways in which elected leaders may initiate constitutional change,
the sovereign citizenry cannot be limited to those formally articulated alter-
natives (pp. 3-4, 30-31).
Those holding this expansive view in the nation's first half century
found vindication in the manner in which the Constitution itself had been
adopted. Although the Articles of Confederation required the unanimous
consent of all thirteen state legislatures to approve any change in the Arti-• • 6
cles' provisions, the Framers concluded that they were not bound by that
procedural requirement (pp. 31, 138-40). Instead, they determined that rati-
fication by nine states' conventions would be sufficient to install a new• 7
constitutional regime. For many, that experience demonstrated that consti-
tutional legitimacy does not invariably require compliance with the
lawmaking procedures laid down by one's predecessors (pp. 146-47). All
that the country needs to know is that, by one means or another, the sover-
eign people have spoken.
Early Americans holding this broad view of the people's sovereignty
faced difficult questions. If the formal ratification of constitutional texts
and the choice of elected leaders are not the sole manifestations of the
sovereign people's will, by what other means can the people's will be ex-
pressed? How does the country know when the people have spoken in
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. V (stating that the amendment process begins either when Congress
proposes amendments or when Congress, "on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments").
6. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII.
7. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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their sovereign capacity, and how can the content of those sovereign expres-
sions be discerned? Fritz finds that many early Americans did not believe it
was necessary to answer those questions with absolute clarity. "During their
Revolution and for a half-century thereafter," Fritz writes, "Americans were
more open to the idea than we are today that a collective sovereign could
rule without insisting on institutions or procedures to verify and discern the
sovereign's will" (p. 277).
Although he does not develop the argument, Fritz suggests that it was
not until the aftermath of the Civil War-when the nation coalesced around
the conviction that the Union was beyond the people's power to dissolve-
that many Americans finally loosened their attachment to the belief that the
sovereign people are always free to determine their own governmental ar-
rangements (pp. 233-34). While even the book's title signals Fritz's belief
that the Civil War was indeed the crucial turning point, there is reason to
believe he entertained doubts as he brought the manuscript to completion. In
the book's closing pages, Fritz drops a footnote suggesting that the broad
conception of the people's sovereignty persisted for another half century
8
Timing questions aside, however, Fritz contends that the narrow view of the
people's sovereignty did indeed ultimately triumph and that the broad un-
derstanding has long ceased to play a meaningful role in American politics
and constitutional scholarship.
B. The Models at Work
In numerous historical events, Fritz finds Americans embracing the
broad view of the people's sovereignty by doing far more than merely exer-
cising their power as "the ruled" to express their views about government
through petitions, protests, editorials, and the like (p. 7). He sees them in-
voking powers that he believes modern Americans would find quite foreign:
either the power of "the ruler" to intervene in day-to-day governmental af-
fairs when elected officials behave in undesirable ways, or the power of "the
sovereign" to fashion entirely new constitutional frameworks by any means
the people deem appropriate (pp. 6-7).9
Fritz begins his historical narrative with states' constitution-making ac-
tivities in the years between the Revolution and the adoption of the federal
Constitution. Although written constitutions quickly emerged as a way in
which the sovereign people could issue "explicit and unilateral orders" (p.
15), ratifying those constitutions "did not exhaust the people's role as the
8. Fritz writes that questions of how and when the broad view died will be "the subject of a
future book," but that "[pireliminary research... suggests that... many of the constitutional under-
standings traced in this book appear to have been displaced and rendered beyond the constitutional
pale only in the course of the Progressive movement of the early twentieth century." P. 280 n.9.
9. The terms "ruler" and "sovereign" are, of course, losely linked. As Fritz acknowledges,
"[t]he different dimensions of the people's authority halve] a natural tendency to blend into one
another." P. 8. Fritz uses the term "ruler" to describe occasions when the people attempt to involve
themselves in govemance matters within the prevailing constitutional framework, and the term
"sovereign" to describe occasions when the people attempt to alter the constitutional framework
itself.
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sovereign" (p. 22). Numerous early state constitutions, for example, ac-
knowledged citizens' inherent right to "alter or abolish" their constitutional
arrangements whenever they wished and by any means they found effica-
cious (pp. 24-25). It was in that spirit that the Framers of the federal
Constitution concluded they were free to disregard the amendment proce-
dures specified in the Articles of Confederation (pp. 30-31).
This belief in the people's unbounded powers soon came into conflict
with the desires of those who were eager to invoke the coercive powers of
government institutions. When Massachusetts debtors found themselves
heavily burdened by their government-enforced debts and by Massachu-
setts's monetary policies in the 1780s, for example, they and their
champions (who together styled themselves as "Regulators") formed county
conventions aimed at expressing the sovereign people's desires on the mat-
ters at issue-a step that their opponents, the self-styled "Friends of
Government," regarded as an illegitimate attempt to bypass the people's
elected leaders (pp. 92-94). When relief for the debtors was not forthcoming
from the state legislature, crowds of Regulators appeared at the state's
courthouses, hoping to shut down those courts' debt-collection proceedings
and thereby place even greater pressure on state legislators to respond to the
debtors' complaints (p. 100). While the Regulators saw themselves as a le-
gitimate voice of the sovereign people, the Friends of Government saw them
as constitutionally illegitimate mobs (p. 101).
Although Massachusetts officials ultimately subdued the Regulators by
force, many American leaders concluded that those events demonstrated the
need "to temper and constrain the more wide-ranging invocations of the
people's sovereignty" (p. 116). The federal Constitution produced in Phila-
delphia the following summer reflected that sentiment in numerous ways. '°
The electoral college, the selection of Senators by state legislatures, and the
amendment provisions of Article V, for example, all were aimed at forcing
commoners to leave the task of governance to political and economic elites
(pp. 133-35). "In the end," Fritz writes, "the federal Constitution, and espe-
cially Article V, reflected an expectation that after the sovereign people
ratified the new constitution, they would thereafter largely disappear"
(p. 138).
Yet the broad conception of the people's sovereign prerogatives was not
easily extinguished. Fritz argues that numerous events over the next half
century reflected the continuing tension between the competing ways of
understanding the sovereignty of the American people:
The Whiskey Rebellion: In the early 1790s, citizens in Pennsylvania and
elsewhere resisted a newly-imposed federal excise tax on whiskey (pp. 161-
65). When several state legislatures failed in their attempt to instruct their
representatives in Congress to oppose the tax, protestors harassed the tax's
10. See Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People(s), Original Understanding, and Constitu-
tional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 171 (1996) ("Understanding the Constitution as a




collectors (by tarring and feathering them, for example) in an effort to pre-
vent them from doing their work, and held meetings and conventions
throughout the country aimed at expressing the sovereign people's desire
that the tax be repealed (pp. 166-70). The tax's opponents believed they
were acting as a legitimate voice of the people (pp. 172-73), while the tax's
defenders believed that "the people should leave representation to their bet-
ters and not second-guess them" (p. 178).
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: Acting as "interposers" between
the people and their elected federal leaders, the Virginia and Kentucky legis-
latures in 1798 sought to alert the sovereign citizenry that the Alien and
Sedition Acts were an unconstitutional abuse of the federal government's
power, and that the people needed to press hard for those statutes' repeal
(pp. 197-201). The statutes' Federalist champions insisted that "the legisla-
tures of Virginia and Kentucky had no business assessing the
constitutionality of the acts" and that the task of constitutional interpretation
ought to be left entirely to the judiciary (p. 202).
The Hartford Convention: In 1814, legislatures and counties throughout
New England sent delegates to a convention aimed at (among other things)
resisting federal efforts to gain control of state militias during the War of
1812 (pp. 211-13). While the delegates to the Hartford Convention claimed
a right to make their own judgments about the constitutionality and wisdom
of the federal government's actions (pp. 213-14), critics sought to affix to
the delegates "the enduring stigma of disloyalty and disunion" (p. 217).
The Nullification Crisis: In the early 1830s, leaders in South Carolina
claimed that the people of each state had a right to nullify federal laws that
they believed were unconstitutional-such as, in this case, a federal law im-
posing tariffs (pp. 219-22). Critics of South Carolina's position argued that
the people of a single state could never claim to be the voice of the nation's
sovereign, and that those who wished to redirect the federal government's
actions were limited to the lawmaking and Constitution-amending proce-
dures specified in the Constitution (p. 224). James Madison unavailingly
tried to strike a middle ground, arguing that the sovereign people had the
power to act "outside the 'forms' of the constitution," but could do so only
when the people of one state acted collectively with the people of other
states (pp. 225-3 1).
The People's Constitution in Rhode Island: Dismayed by the Rhode
Island legislature's repeated refusal to repair defects in the State's 1663
charter, critics of the charter government held a constitutional convention in
1841 (pp. 246-53). The delegates to that convention produced the "People's
Constitution," which was quickly ratified in accordance with its own terms,
and elections under that constitution were promptly held (p. 254). Those
who defended the charter government insisted that the 1841 convention was
illegitimate because it had been held without the consent of the existing
government and had bypassed the charter's amendment provisions (pp. 245,
254). While awaiting the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that would declare the
[Vol. 108:939
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battle between the two governments a nonjusticiable political question,"
Thomas Dorr-who had led the effort to adopt the People's Constitution-
issued a warning that Fritz likely finds prescient and that brings his his-
torical narrative to a close. Without continual reminders of the sovereign
powers they possess, Dorr cautioned, the American people are likely to
grow accustomed to the notion that their law-shaping activities must al-
ways occur within the narrow confines of established, government-
approved procedures, and they thus are likely to forget that they, not their
elected leaders, are the nation's true sovereign (p. 275).
II. THE AMERICAN SOVEREIGN TODAY
For a variety of reasons, Fritz's claim that the broad view of the people's
sovereignty has perished might initially ring true for many readers. One
does not find direct modern counterparts to the formal conventions that early
Americans formed, for example, when displeased with the federal excise tax
on whiskey, with the federal attempt to take control of state militias, and
with the perpetuation of Rhode Island's original charter government. Efforts
in the early twentieth century to amend Article V so that citizens could have
a direct voice in proposing or ratifying federal constitutional amendments
went nowhere, thus ostensibly leaving control of the amendment process
entirely in government officials' hands. 2 With respect to judicial supremacy,
it has become commonplace for constitutional scholars to insist upon the
need for life-tenured federal judges to protect political minorities from the
rights-trampling impulses of hotheaded political majorities and their repre-
sentatives in the nation's legislative and executive branches. 13 One thus is
not surprised when Fritz contends that the narrow view of the people's sov-
ereignty has triumphed, just as one was not surprised when Larry Kramer
observed in 2004 that "skepticism about people and about democracy is a
pervasive feature of contemporary intellectual culture,' 4 or when Roberto
Unger wrote in 1996 that "discomfort with democracy" is so prevalent in
today's political, judicial, and academic circles that "[flear and loathing of
the people always threaten to become the ruling passions of this legal cul-
ture."15
Yet the American people's perception of their own sovereignty, and their
capacity to wield control over the nation's governmental affairs, are re-
markably resilient-a point one can miss only if one mistakenly insists that,
if the American people do not manifest their sovereignty in one particular
II. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 47 (1849).
12. See LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
177-78, 192 (1942) (noting such efforts).
13. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 221-29 (2004) (describing the
modem ascendancy of judicial supremacy).
14. Id. at 243.




form or fashion, then they have essentially ceded their sovereign powers to
government officials. As Fritz acknowledges, the broad view of the people's
sovereignty does not demand that the people express their sovereign desires
in any particular form (pp. 3-4, 30-31, 98-99). The American people's will-
ingness to allow the practice of assembling in popular conventions to fall
into relative desuetude, for example, should not be seen as tantamount to a
decision to embrace the cramped view of the people's sovereignty that Fritz
believes now prevails. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many be-
lieved that the sovereign people's will could be manifested in ways as
informal as the appearance of "public crowds, gatherings, and mobs"-an
expression of the people's will was simply "something you knew, recog-
nized, and accorded legitimacy when you saw it" (p. 293). There are very
real ways in which that remains true today. To conclude otherwise is to mis-
take a change of tactics for a change of convictions.
I argue in Section II.A that, at times, modem Americans' claim to sover-
eignty expresses itself in conduct comparable to that of the Massachusetts
Regulators who shut down state courthouses in order to thwart the collection
of debts and that of the critics of the federal whiskey tax who physically
resisted the federal government's tax-collection efforts. Fritz is simply mis-
taken when he asserts that "the modern observer" would invariably regard
those as "illegitimate acts" (p. 300). I argue in Section II.B that, more fre-
quently, one finds the American people expressing their sovereignty in ways
that permit government institutions to retain the credibility and relevance
they need in order to help accomplish the sovereign people's objectives, but
that permit the sovereign people's will to prevail in the end.
A. Direct Interventions in Governmental Affairs
On February 1, 1960, four African American freshmen from North
Carolina A&T College entered a Woolworth's store in Greensboro, North
Carolina, seated themselves at the store's whites-only lunch counter, and-
when told that the store would stand by its racially discriminatory service
policies-politely reported that they intended to stay and to return daily un-
til they had received the same service that white customers received. 6 By
ignoring management's demand that they leave, the four young men knew
they were violating the state's trespass laws, but concluded "that not until
blacks trespassed would their right to equal service be established. '7 As the
freshmen's supporters rapidly grew in number in the following days, North
Carolina's attorney general urged the store's management to have all of
them arrested on trespassing charges,18 but Woolworth's ultimately chose to
desegregate instead.' 9 That incident and others like it across the South
16. WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 112-20 (1980) (describing the en-
counter).
17. ld. at 141.
18. Id. at 120-21.
19. Id. at 136.
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helped fuel a civil-rights movement that culminated in sweeping legislative
and social changes-changes that, while certainly not curing all of the na-
tion's racial evils, carried the cause of progress a very long way indeed .
What are we to make of the Greensboro sit-ins and of comparable acts
of direct civil disobedience more generally?2' In one respect, of course, they
are a form of protest aimed at pressuring lawmakers, business owners, or
other actors to adopt the protestors' preferred course of action.22 By breaking
the law and agreeing to suffer the consequences, the protestors hope to draw
attention to their cause and provoke their leaders to respond. 21 Yet the stu-
dents who participated in the Greensboro sit-ins were doing much more than
merely protesting. By engaging in the very conduct that they believed soci-
ety's laws and norms ought to permit and protect, they were claiming not
merely the power to express their views about the legal and social order they
desired, but the greater power to play a direct role in constructing it. 24 The
students and their supporters, in other words, began to live the regime they
preferred. As William Chafe puts it, the students and other like-minded law
reformers in the 1960s demonstrated that they would not "allow anyone else
to define their rights.,2 5 By forging ahead with the construction of a new
regime, rather than waiting until they had won the support of those who had
been formally elected to positions of governmental power, the Greensboro
students and others like them served "as the catalyst that triggered a decade
of revolt-one of the greatest movements in history toward self-
determination and human dignity.
' 26
In the Greensboro students, one can easily spot the genealogical residue
of the Regulators who shut down Massachusetts' debt-collecting court-
houses in the 1780s and of the citizens who disrupted the efforts of federal
20. See ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND 1-3 (1990) (using the Greensboro incident to
introduce the author's superb treatment of the civil rights movement in the 1960s).
21. By "direct" civil disobedience, I mean to refer to instances in which activists violate one
or more of the very same laws to which they object. The Greensboro students objected to a cluster
of racially discriminatory laws and social norms, including the state trespass laws that permitted a
white store owner to demand that black would-be customers leave the premises because of their
race. Such acts of civil disobedience may be distinguished from "indirect" disobedient acts, in
which activists violate one law in order to convey a message about some unrelated law or policy
(such as when individuals illegally climb a bridge in order to hang a banner protesting nuclear pro-
liferation). See generally CARL COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE LAW
52 (1971) (distinguishing between direct and indirect acts of disobedience).
22. See, e.g., ELLIOT M. ZASHIN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 118 (1972) (defin-
ing civil disobedience as a "form[] of protest" that involves "a knowing violation of a public norm"
and "is nonrevolutionary, public, and nonviolent").
23. See COHEN, supra note 21, at 16 (discussing this aspect of civil disobedience).
24. See Daria Roithmayr, Left(Over) Rights, 5 L. TEXT CULTURE 407, 439 (2000) (stating
that the Greensboro sit-ins and other comparable acts were "a transgressive performance of unimag-
inable proportions, momentarily disrupting the web of social rules and customs and replacing them
with evocative glimpses of what formal equality and integration might look and feel like").
25. CHAFE, supra note 16, at 131.
26. Id. at 137; see also I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 108 (1991)
("The civil rights movement of the 1950's and 1960's was the most successful act of popular trans-
formation in recent history.").
April 20101
Michigan Law Review
whiskey-tax collectors in the 1790s. Like their early-American predeces-
sors, the students and their supporters were seeking to accomplish "what
voting, coalition-formation, bargaining, and observation of the rules of the
game could not."7 Rather than engage in traditional forms of political per-
suasion and then defer to the ultimate judgment of elected officials, these
activists took matters into their own hands, such that "elections, court deci-
sions, and even legislative victories were the events that punctuated the real
ongoing political process."2" They embraced, in other words, an expansive
view of the American people's sovereignty.
The relationship between such acts of civil disobedience and the broad
view of the people's sovereignty becomes even clearer when one considers
one of the leading arguments against civil disobedience's legitimacy. Oppo-
nents of such disobedience commonly contend that, although one might
have the right to engage in civil disobedience in repressive regimes, one has
no such right in a democracy, where one can make one's preferences known
to government officials in numerous lawful ways.29 "To hold otherwise,"
those holding this view argue, "would not only undercut legality; it would
allow each citizen the right to pick and choose which laws he will obey and
thus invite anarchy or chaos."30 In that argument, one hears unmistakable
echoes of the claim made by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century advocates
of the narrow view of the people's sovereignty: after choosing leaders on
Election Day and engaging in government-approved forms of political ad-
vocacy, citizens must defer to their elected leaders' ultimate decisions. The
rebuttal to that argument rests squarely on the conviction that sovereignty-
claiming citizens in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shared: when
government leaders are unresponsive, the sovereign people need not restrict
their law-shaping activities to government-approved channels."
Of course, no matter what their goals, activists who choose to circum-
vent unresponsive government leaders usually do not entirely reject those
leaders' claims to power and relevance. To the contrary, those activists
almost always wish to have their preferences embraced by the appropriate
government bodies. The Greensboro freshmen and their supporters across
the country, for example, were eager to advance a broad civil-rights agen-
da in the nation's legislatures and courts. Many of Fritz's activists in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries desired government officials' embrace,
too-the Regulators wanted the Massachusetts legislature to respond to
27. BURTON ZWIEBACH, CIVILITY AND DISOBEDIENCE 168 (1975) (analogizing such acts of
civil disobedience to "the plotting of the American revolutionists").
28. BARBARA RANSBY, ELLA BAKER & THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT 370 (2003).
29. See ZASHIN, supra note 22, at 229-31 (elaborating upon this argument).
30. ZWIEBACH, supra note 27, at 148; see also id. at 166-68 (rejecting this argument).
31. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Legal and Ethical Position of the Code of Profes-
sional Ethics, in 5 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: JOURNALISM, LAW, MEDICINE 5 (Louis W. Hodges ed.,
1979) ("[A]IIl persons who are seriously concerned with law must entertain the notion of civil dis-
obedience.... The law wishes us to accept its imperialism, its claim to the total and preemptive. But
we must resist that claim. We must stand outside the law and deny it complete normative sover-
eignty.").
[Vol. 108:939
The Vitality of the American Sovereign
debtors' needs, the activists in Pennsylvania and elsewhere wanted Con-
gress to repeal the whiskey tax, the proponents of the Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions wanted Congress to repeal the Alien and Sedition
Acts, and the delegates to the Hartford Convention wanted federal leaders
to end their effort to gain control of the states' militias. That desire for legis-
lative, executive, or judicial validation need not be taken as a concession
that sovereignty rests in the hands of government officials. Rather, it can be
seen simply as an acknowledgment that the most practical way to try to ce-
ment one's victories in the battle to articulate and implement the sovereign
people's will is to enlist the support of the people's government and its
elaborate structures and resources. Once the activists' desires have been sat-
isfactorily embodied in legislation, executive policies, or judicial rulings,
those activists can return to their own daily lives, leaving to judges and
elected leaders the task of day-to-day governance until activists who style
themselves as the voice of the sovereign people again perceive the need to
intervene.32
Sovereignty-claiming citizens' interventions in day-to-day governmental
affairs are not limited to Greensboro-style acts of direct civil disobedience.
For example, although the Supreme Court has insisted that "it is the duty of
juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to
the facts as they find them to be,, 33 jurors nevertheless sometimes exercise
their power to acquit criminal defendants whose guilt they believe has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt.34 When jurors refuse to apply the
law as it has been explained to them by the presiding judge, they are taking
the law squarely into their own hands and rendering judgments based on
their own uncodified conceptions of justice. Although juror nullification was
deemed legitimate by some of the nation's early leaders, political and judi-
cial elites eventually concluded "that under a republic the protection of
citizens [lies] not in recognizing the right of each jury to make its own law,
but in following democratic processes for changing the law."35 Yet despite
the modem charge that jury nullification constitutes an illegitimate form of
lawmaking, the practice persists. When jurors do engage in nullification,
they plainly are acting upon a broad conception of the people's sovereignty.
Just as in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America, citizens today
can disagree sharply about whether those who take matters into their own
hands are legitimately expressing the will of the sovereign people or are
illegitimately thwarting the actions of the people's elected representatives.
32. Cf ACKERMAN, supra note 26, at 40-49 (describing occasions when the sovereign peo-
ple have cemented constitutional victories by winning the support of elected and judicial officials).
33. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
34. See Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2381, 2416-
17 (1999) (acknowledging anecdotal accounts of jury nullification, but stating that it is difficult to
determine the frequency with which nullification actually occurs).
35. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Richard St.
John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury
Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563, 2577-82 (1997) (arguing that jury nullification constitutes ille-
gitimate lawmaking by unelected and politically unaccountable individuals).
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Consider, for example, events in Florida during the controversial presiden-
tial election of 2000. When Florida officials began to recount ballots by
hand using varying criteria, a number of George W. Bush's supporters (some
of them staffers from Capitol Hill, some of them citizens from Florida and
elsewhere) appeared at sites where the ballots were being recounted, hoping• 36
to disrupt the recount and thereby preserve Bush's apparent victory. If one
asks a politically diverse group of people today how they perceived those
disruption efforts, one is likely to hear two very different stories. In the eyes
of many Al Gore supporters, the interventionists were bullying thugs who
were illegitimately thwarting Florida officials' attempt to do their jobs.37 In the
eyes of many Bush supporters, the interventionists were heroically attempting
to thwart an illegitimate recount." Where would the interventionists and those
who applauded them get the idea that they were entitled to step in when they
objected to decisions made by Florida's election officials? Rightly or
wrongly, they would get it from the broad view of the people's sovereignty
that Fritz mistakenly believes no longer plays a meaningful role in American
public life.
B. The Sovereignty Dance
On most occasions, however, citizens choose to operate within the con-
straints of the nation's officially approved lawmaking procedures. They
make that choice for at least two different reasons. The first reason concerns
citizens' perception of their individual self-interest, while the second con-
cerns what I describe as the "sovereignty dance," a dance that pairs the
people with their chosen leaders in ways that transcend the differences be-
tween the broad and narrow conceptions of the people's sovereignty.
First, citizens ordinarily comply with the nation's approved lawmaking
procedures because they intuitively recognize that it would be against their
interests to strip the nation's legislative, executive, and judicial bodies of the
aura of respect and power they need in order to remain effective instruments
of the people's will. Each time unhappy citizens circumvent the nation's
ordinary lawmaking mechanisms, they risk discrediting the institutions in
which those mechanisms are housed and thus risk undercutting their ability
to rely upon the power of those institutions in the future. Similarly, if citi-
zens play outside the nation's ordinary lawmaking rules today because they
are unhappy with the outcomes that compliance with those rules would like-
36. Karen Masterson, Democrats: Voting Rights Violated, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 29, 2000, at
A12 (reporting on the incidents).
37. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Tea Parties Forever, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at A21 (describ-
ing those "riots" as "fake grass roots" events that were "actually orchestrated by G.O.P. strategists");
see also Masterson, supra note 36 (reporting some Democrats' charge that "the activists, flown in
from around the country, were guilty of intimidation, a violation of the Voting Rights Act").
38. See Masterson, supra note 36 (reporting some Republicans' belief that the activists were
exercising "a fundamental American right").
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ly yield, they weaken their ability to insist that their opponents play by those
same rules when the tables are turned tomorrow.
39
Second, and even more fundamentally, the American people have
learned that, when they wish to change the status quo, they generally need
not choose between either trying to take the reins of government entirely
into their own hands or passively hoping that the next round of elections and
judicial appointments will produce like-minded leaders. By patiently joining
with government officials in the sovereignty dance, the American people can
permit those officials to retain the power and relevance they need in order to
do the people's work, but can ensure that the sovereign people's desires will
ultimately prevail. 4°
The most striking examples of the sovereignty dance may be found in
the area of federal constitutional change-the area in which one might ini-
tially think citizens are most at the mercy of their elected leaders. On the
constrained view of the people's sovereignty (the view Fritz believes has
long prevailed), the nation's constitutional commitments may be altered
only when the people's elected leaders take the country through the formal
amendment process specified in Article V. If that were an accurate descrip-
tion of the American constitutional system, one would expect to find no
significant changes in the nation's constitutional bearings-no changes that
are widely, even if not universally, embraced as legitimate-other than those
springing from alterations of the nation's formally ratified constitutional
texts. As a description of how constitutional change actually occurs in mod-
em America, however, that account is patently false.4'
As Bruce Ackerman recently observed, "Every American intuitively rec-
ognizes that the modern [formal] amendments tell a very, very small part of
the big constitutional story of the twentieth century-and that we have to
look elsewhere to understand the rest.' 42 In areas ranging from the dramatic
increase in the scope of the federal government's regulatory power, to the
increased power of the president, to the recognition of a right to privacy and
other civil rights, to dramatic reforms of the criminal justice system, vast
changes have been made in America's constitutional landscape over the past
39. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1119,
1122 (1998) ("Someone who loses a legislative battle today accepts that loss in exchange for cer-
tainty that next year's victory on some other subject will be accepted by other losers in their turn.");
Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1836 (2009) ("Political actors and their constituents might not find it
in their interests to violate particular constitutional rules if the result will be a breakdown of the
larger constitutional game.").
40. Fritz's historical narrative actually offers some of the early case studies from which that
lesson was ultimately learned: activists who lost their short-term battle to seize governmental power
often got what they wanted in the long run. The Friends of Government in Massachusetts were
swept out of power in the election following the Regulators' ostensible defeat, for example, and the
Rhode Island government eventually adopted "a new constitutional order that looked very much like
the one embraced by the popular ratification of the People's Constitution." P. 286.
41. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
884 (1996) ("Most of the great revolutions in American constitutionalism have taken place without
any authorizing or triggering constitutional amendment.").
42. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1750 (2007).
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century without any provocation from newly ratified constitutional texts.43
Although scholars have not yet agreed upon a comprehensive account of
how non-Article V amendments are proposed, debated, and ultimately ac-
cepted as part of the nation's constitutional canon, any credible account
will acknowledge that ordinary citizens often play leading roles in the proc-
ess.
In the modem era, for example, it is often through citizen-led social
movements that the status quo is publicly called into question and the possi-
bility of constitutional change is placed-and kept-on the nation's
agenda.4 ' Reva Siegel's examination of what she calls the "de facto Equal
Rights Amendment" provides an illustration.46 In the mid-1900s, the Na-
tional Organization for Women ("N.O.W.") and affiliated grassroots leaders
launched a movement seeking broad-ranging constitutional equality for the47
sexes. That movement engaged citizens and government officials in a pe-
riod of sustained debate, a debate that ultimately prompted the Supreme• 48
Court to revamp its equal protection analysis for sex-based classifications.
Article V's nonexclusivity was underscored by the fact that the N.O.W.'s
movement achieved its successes even as the effort to secure formal ratifica-
tion of the Equal Rights Amendment was ending in failure.
The heart of the sovereignty dance may be found in the period between
the placement of an item on the nation's constitutional agenda (whether by
citizens, politicians, or the courts) and the eventual perception of actual con-
stitutional change. During that time, the citizenry, elected leaders, and
judges engage in an extended conversation both at the state and national
levels, a conversation marked by proposals and counterproposals, actions
43. Strauss, supra note 41, at 884 (listing these and other examples).
44. Compare, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 42, at 1759-62 (describing a "movement-party-
presidency" model of constitutional change), with Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Under-
standing the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (2001) (emphasizing the
importance of "[p]artisan entrenchment through presidential appointments to the judiciary"), with
James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1537-39
(1998) (reviewing 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)) (emphasiz-
ing the importance of creative acts of judicial review), with Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and
the "Statutory Constitution", 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROes. 243, 254-66 (1993) (identifying
hallmarks of non-Article V "regime changes").
45. See Ackerman, supra note 42, at 1759-60 (stating that constitutional change begins when
there emerge "activists, a large body of citizens who are willing to invest enormous time and energy
in the pursuit of a new constitutional agenda"); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Prac-
tices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 949 (2006) ("Social movements ... can
change the meaning of constitutional norms, and thus alter the constitutional legitimacy or illegiti-
macy of particular social practices."); Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of the Man ": James Madison,
Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 751
(2006) ("Social movements, different parts of civil society, even individuals may equally launch a
campaign based on a novel reading of the Constitution, with the test of validity being only whether
they can persuade enough others to embrace or adopt their position.").
46. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the defacto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1366-418 (2006).
47. Id. at 1367-68.
48. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
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and reactions, as citizens and officials signal their desires and intentions and
then wait for others to respond. 49 Through their participation in political par-
ties and other organizations, citizens work to install their allies in positions
of governmental power and respond to officeholders' behavior, ° while those
same officeholders seek to mobilize like-minded citizens and respond to the
behavior of the citizenry.5 The goal shared by all participants in that ongo-
ing exchange is to propose the synthesis of the nation's constitutional values
that ultimately wins the acceptance of the sovereign citizenry.52
Citizens also play a powerful role in shaping the culture in which vot-
ers', politicians', and judges' values are formed." Women who acted upon
reconceived career and family objectives in the 1960s and 1970s, for exam-
ple, offered new models of womanhood and helped to shape the social
norms that ultimately were manifested in the Court's equal protection and
privacy rulings. Similarly, by taking their relationships public and winning
for themselves an ever-increasing public perception of normalcy, same-sex
couples have shaped the culture in ways without which rulings such as
Lawrence v. Texas54 would be difficult to imagine.
The people's control over their government is thus indirect, but never-
theless very real. It ultimately is up to the sovereign people to decide
whether to accept any given constitutional synthesis and permit it to "sink
deeply into [their] normative consciousness.55 Consider the property owner
49. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (Yale
Univ. Press 1978) (1970) ("Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the begin-
nings of conversations between the Court and the people and their representatives."); Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation
of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2029 (2003) ("The plain historical fact is
that judicial and nonjudicial interpretations of the Constitution frequently coexist and contend for
the allegiance of the country."); cf. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 45, at 947 ("Courts arrive in medias
res, absorbing the shocks caused by social movements and assisting in the reconstitution of social
understandings in the wake of movement struggle.").
50. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 44, at 1068 ("A key function of political parties is to
negotiate and interpret political meanings and assimilate the demands of constituents and social
movements; as such, parties are the major source of constitutional transformations.").
51. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Con-
stitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 567 (2006) (describing conservative justices' efforts to "excite
the anger, fears, and resentments of conservative constituencies, and thus to fan the fires of political
mobilization"). Liberal justices engage in the same practice. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 923 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I remain steadfast in my belief that
the right to reproductive choice is entitled to ... full protection .... And I fear for the darkness as
four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to extinguish the light.").
52. Cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 18-19 (2001) (arguing
that a proposition's constitutional validity ultimately turns upon its acceptance by the citizenry).
53. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COM-
MENT. 427, 513-14 (2007) (discussing culture's impact on judges).
54. 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding that the states cannot criminalize private, consen-
sual sexual activity between adults of the same sex).
55. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1217
(2001) (discussing the way in which certain statutes acquire constitution-like status); cf 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 29 (1998) (arguing that rigid adherence to Article
V would "stifle the expression of constitutional movements that have won the continuing support of
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who engages in a series of exchanges with an architect about the design of a
new home, with the owner and the architect repeatedly reacting to one an-
other's contributions to the process, but with the owner holding the ultimate
power to choose the final design. It is much the same in the realm of consti-
tutional politics. Politicians and judges are responsible for drafting most of
the operative texts in their repeated interactions with the citizenry, but it ul-
timately is the sovereign American people who decide when an acceptable
constitutional settlement has been reached 6
This untidy, patience-demanding process is marked by the very same
kinds of uncertainties that champions of the broad view of the people's sov-
ereignty confronted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Once one
moves beyond the confines of Article V, it can be extraordinarily difficult to
ascertain at any given moment whether the sovereign people have spoken
and, if so, precisely what it is they have said." In the area of same-sex mar-
riage, for example, the nation's constitutional conversation is plainly still in
progress; in the area of abortion, where it has been more than thirty-five
years since the Court decided Roe v. Wade, s there are many conservatives
who insist that a firm constitutional settlement has not yet been reached. As
Fritz acknowledges when discussing some of America's early experiences
(p. 277), those uncertainties are simply the price a nation pays when its citi-
zenry rules as the collective sovereign.
Those uncertainties are not mere side effects of the sovereignty dance-
they are part of what makes that dance so attractive to the American people.
The very fact that one often cannot know with certainty whether the sover-
eign people have rendered their final judgment on a given matter-and that
much about the Constitution's meaning thus remains both contestable and
contested-helps to ensure that a diverse citizenry will remain bound to-
gether by the project of interpreting their shared constitutional traditions,
and by the hope that the national community might yet turn in the direction
that one prefers. 9 Relatedly, the dance's polycentrism ensures that the sov-
ereign people will get the benefit of numerous voices and perspectives
before settling upon any particular constitutional arrangement. Ronald
Dworkin points out, for example, that the courts bring to the nation's consti-
a decisive and sustained majority after years of mobilized debate penetrating deeply into the con-
sciousness of ordinary citizens").
56. Cf ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 241 (2006) (arguing that courts'
unpopular rulings are rarely "able to withstand sustained majoritarian pressure for more than a gen-
eration or so").
57. See Kramer, supra note 45, at 751 (stating that the process of amending the Constitution
outside Article V "is as undefined and unspecified as anything else that gets decided in the hurly
burly of politics and public debate").
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS 213 (2002) ("American
constitutionalism can be read as an ongoing proposal to maintain political community in the teeth
of, and indeed through means of, robust disagreement.").
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tutional debates a valuable focus "on matters of principle" that other gov-
ernmental actors are unlikely to provide. 0
Perhaps most important of all, engaging in the sovereignty dance with
government officials ensures that while government institutions will ulti-
mately yield to sustained manifestations of the sovereign people's will,
those institutions are not so susceptible to pressure that they lose their ca-
pacity to enforce the people's will against outliers once a constitutional
settlement has been at least temporarily achieved . We permit ourselves to
be bound by the Supreme Court's unfavorable rulings in the short run, for
example, because we believe that, in future constitutional battles, the Court
may be a powerful ally. A government institution cannot be trusted to offer
our opponents meaningful resistance tomorrow if we do not permit it to
provide us with meaningful resistance today. Short-term setbacks at the
hands of government officials thus are not incompatible with the people's
sovereignty. Those setbacks are simply part and parcel with the people's
desire to enjoy the benefits of having robust government institutions over the
long run. We don't shove our government institutions to the side when they
make a misstep; we take a patient breath and continue to dance.
CONCLUSION
Fritz mistakes the value of his rich historical narrative. His account does
not, as he believes, illustrate a lost conception of the people's sovereignty.
Rather, it provides readers with a valuable perspective on the challenges that
Americans have always faced in trying to rule a vast nation as its collective
sovereign. It can be as difficult today as it ever has been to determine
whether the sovereign people have spoken and, if so, what it is they have
said. Those difficulties are simply inherent in the American constitutional
system. The American people's tactics may have changed over the past two
centuries, but their overarching objective remains the same. The sovereign
people will get what they want in the end.
60. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 345 (1996); cf LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN
PLAINCLOTHES 202-05 (2004) (arguing that life-tenured judges are more open than elected officials
to the claims of individuals who lack money or a powerful political voice).
61. Cf Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 39, at 1833 ("Most of the Court's major interven-
tions have been to impose an emerging or consolidated national consensus on local outliers.");
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 373, 385 (2007) ("Those who wish to change the content of constitutional law.., face
a dilemma: they must sway courts to their own constitutional values and yet they must also preserve
the authority of courts to speak for the Constitution in the name of an independent rule of law.").
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